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A number of cases dealing with the admission of confessions made by
criminal defendants were decided by the court during the survey period. The
cases generally involved the application and interpretation of existing doc-
trines, although some for the first time in West Virginia. Several of the deci-
sions set to rest unresolved questions while others create new areas of
uncertainty.
I. In Camera VOLUNTARINESS HEARINGS
State ex rel. White v. Mohn, 283 S.E.2d 914 (W. Va. 1981)
With the decision of State ex rel. White v. Mohn,1 the failure of a trial
court to hold an in camera voluntariness hearing prior to the admission of a
confession by a criminal defendant is no longer reversible error. The Mohn
decision overruled the portion of State v. Fortner2 that declared that the fail-
ure to hold the hearing would result in automatic reversal. The court instead
adopted the procedure set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Jack-
son v. Denno.3
The new procedure provides that a case must be remanded to the trial
court for a voluntariness hearing when a confession is admitted without one.
The determination of voluntariness made at the hearing is to be used as the
basis for allowing the conviction to stand or to be set aside.
The court had previously adopted this procedure in other areas.4 In State
v. Clawson,5 the court discussed the procedure in relation to voluntariness
hearings. That discussion was, however, limited to dictum since the case was
reversed on other grounds.
The Mohn holding does not affect the trial court's duty established in
Fortner to conduct voluntariness hearings, whether requested or not.6 The
adoption of the Jackson v. Denno procedure merely provides an alternative to
automatic reversal when trial courts fail to hold the hearings.
1 283 S.E.2d 914 (W. Va. 1981).
2 150 W. Va. 571, 148 S.E.2d 669 (1966), overruled, 283 S.E.2d 914 (W. Va. 1981).
3 378 U.S. 368 (1964). In Jackson, the Court determined that failure of a state trial court to
hold a constitutionally mandated voluntariness hearing did not justify the granting of a writ of
habeas corpus or automatic reversal. The Court remanded to the state court to conduct a volunta-
riness hearing. The determination of voluntariness made at that hearing would govern whether the
defendant would have his conviction affirmed or receive a new trial. Id. at 394.
4 See State v. Brewster, 261 S.E.2d 77, 82 (W. Va. 1979) (remand to determine if shackling of
defendant during trial was warranted); State v. Lawson, 267 S.E.2d 438 (W. Va. 1980) (remand for
blood tests).
270 S.E.2d 659, 671 (W. Va. 1980). Jackson v. Denno was referred to by the court in Fortner
as containing a "collation of the rules obtaining in the various states regarding the admission of
confessions in evidence." 150 W. Va. at 579, 148 S.E.2d at 674.
6 150 W. Va. at 579, 148 S.E.2d at 674.
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II. TESTS FOR VOLUNTARINESS AND PROMPT PRESENTMENT
State v. Persinger, 186 S.E.2d 261 (W. Va. 1982)
State v. Mitter, 289 S.E.2d 457 (W. Va. 1982)
The "totality of the circumstances" test for gauging the voluntariness of
confessions was adopted by the court in State v. Persinger The decision also
involved strict application of the prompt presentment statute."
The defendant in Persinger had been arrested by a deputy sheriff and city
police officer for sexual assault. The defendant was transported to the city po-
lice station where he was advised of and waived his rights. The defendant gave
two tape recorded statements to police. In the first statement, he denied com-
mitting the offense. However, in the second statement the defendant said he
had lied in the first statement and made an inculpatory statement in which he
admitted that he had engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim. After
making the second statement the defendant was transported to the county jail
and incarcerated.
The trial court found the second statement to have been voluntarily given
and admitted it into evidence. The defendant was subsequently convicted of
third degree sexual assault.
The supreme court reversed the conviction, holding that the second con-
fession should not have been admitted. The court stated that the "totality of
the circumstances" test, which examines the background, experience and con-
duct of the accused, was the proper test to determine voluntariness.9 The court
briefly discussed the application of the totality test in the defendant's case, but
found the statement to be involuntary because of several errors committed by
police.
In examining the trial court record, the court observed that the defendant
had requested counsel between his first and second statement. Therefore, the
court held that the continued police interrogation of the defendant violated his
Miranda rights and rendered the second statement involuntary.10
The court also indicated that the defendant's confession may have been
rendered involuntary by a violation of the prompt presentment statute." The
" 286 S.E.2d 261 (W. Va. 1982). The totality test was adopted to examine confessions by mi-
nors in State v. Laws, 251 S.E.2d 769, 772 (W. Va. 1978).
8 W. VA. CODE § 62-1-5 (1977).
9 286 S.E.2d at 267. The Persinger court attributed the use of the "totality" test to gauge
voluntariness to Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). However, the Persinger court stated that
Edwards held that a confession is "involuntary" if rendered without counsel after counsel had
been requested. 286 S.E.2d at 267. Actually, the Supreme Court held the confession in Edwards to
be "inadmissible" because the right to counsel had been violated. 451 U.S. at 487. See also State v.
McNeal, 251 S.E.2d 484, 487 (W. Va. 1979); see infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text (discus-
sion on the court's use of "inadmissible" and "involuntary").
:0 286 S.E.2d at 271.
' W. VA. CODE § 62-1-5 (1977). The statute reads in part:
An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint, or any person
making an arrest without a warrant for an offense committed in his presence, shall take
the arrested person without unnecessary delay before a [magistrate] of the county in
[Vol. 85
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court adopted a rule that makes it unreasonable and unnecessary to delay an
arraignment for the sole purpose of obtaining a confession from a defendant.
The delay factor is critical in evaluating voluntariness. However, the focus is
not on the length, but on the purpose of the delay. 2
Finally, the court identified another reason it felt the confession should
have been excluded. An officer told the defendant during the interrogation that
if he cooperated, the officer would "give a good recommendation to the proba-
tion officer at the time of presentence investigation."'' 3 Under State v. Par-
son,14 statements "calculated to foment hope for leniency in the mind of the
accused" result in a confession being rendered involuntary. 5 The Persinger
court applied the Parson test and found the statement was inadmissible.""
The Persinger rule detailing the requirement of the prompt presentment
statute was applied in State v. Mitter.1 In Mitter, the court held that a con-
fession obtained in violation of the statute was inadmissible. 18
The defendant in Mitter was suspected in an unsolved murder and was
requested by letter to appear at the prosecuting attorney's office for question-
ing. The defendant appeared, waived his rights, and made an inculpatory
statement. After that statement was reduced to writing, police continued to
question the defendant about major discrepancies that existed between his
statement and known facts of the case. A second statement was obtained sev-
eral hours after the first; this statement more in line with the known facts.
After that confession was transcribed, the defendant was formally arrested and
arraigned before a magistrate.
The trial court record revealed that a magistrate had been alerted that his
services would be required before the first statement was obtained.'19 Addition-
ally, one of the officers testified that he believed probable cause to arrest ex-
isted before the defendant gave the first statement, although another officer
testified that probable cause existed only after the first inculpatory statement
was made.20 The trial court had agreed with the second officer and ruled that
probable cause did not exist until after the first statement was obtained.
The supreme court held the first statement was admissible and the delay
to transcribe it did not violate the prompt presentment statute.2' The court
found, however, that the second statement, which was admitted by the trial
court, was inadmissible because, in its view, the delay in arraignment following
which the arrest is made.
See also W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 5(a) (effective October 1, 1981).
Is 286 S.E.2d at 270.
Is Id. at 271.
1, 108 W. Va. 705, 152 S.E. 745 (1930).
,5 Id. at 708, 152 S.E. at 746.
16 286 S.E.2d at 273.
17 289 S.E.2d 457 (W. Va. 1982).
Is Id. at 461-62.
19 Id. at 460.
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the first statement was for the "explicit purpose of rendering a useable
confession .... 22
Although impossible to determine when the defendant was arrested, in the
sense that his liberty was restrained, the court felt it reasonable to assume the
defendant was not free to leave after the first statement was made. The court
held that under those circumstances, the prompt presentment statute required
him to be arraigned without unreasonable delay.23 The delay to obtain the sec-
ond confession was, therefore, considered unreasonable and unnecessary and
rendered the confession inadmissible.
The Persinger and Mitter holdings may present problems in their applica-
tion. The strict prompt presentment rule adopted by the court could prevent
law enforcement officers from taking prearraignment statements from coopera-
tive suspects arrested with warrants even if a rights waiver is obtained. Police
must also become acutely aware of when courts may construe a suspect to be
under arrest in an interrogation setting if inculpatory statements are made.
The impact of the prompt presentment rule in these situations is made harsher
since a suspect who requests court appointed counsel at arraignment is pre-
vented from making admissible statements to police until after counsel is ap-
pointed.2' The rule as adopted may significantly reduce the ability of police to
conduct a thorough and proper investigation.
2 5
III. USE OF INADMISSMLE CONFESSIONS FOR IMPEACHMENT
State v. Goodmon, 290 S.E.2d 260 (W. Va. 1981)
State v. Vance, 285 S.E.2d 437 (W. Va. 1981)
State v. Goff, 289 S.E.2d 473 (W. Va. 1982)
Deciding an issue of first impression in West Virginia, the court held in
State v. Goodmon" that inadmissible confessions voluntarily rendered may be
used for impeachment purposes. The majority decision adopts the federal rule
set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Harris v. New York 27 and
Oregon v. Haas.
28
In Goodmon, the defendant confessed to his girlfriend, in the presence of
police officers, that he murdered her sister. The court found that this confes-
sion was properly admitted at trial.
29
After making these statements, the defendant was arrested and arraigned
before a magistrate. He requested court appointed counsel at his arraignment.
22 Id. at 462.
"Id.
See, e.g., Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. at 487; State v. Goodmon, 290 S.E.2d 260, 266 (W.
Va. 1981); State v. Vance, 285 S.E.2d 437, 441 (W. Va. 1981).
25 For a collection of decisions on the application of prompt presentment statute requirements
by other state and federal courts, see 19 A.L.R.2d 1331 (and Later Case Service).
26 290 S.E.2d 260 (W. Va. 1981).
401 U.S. 222 (1971).
- 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
29 290 S.E.2d at 266.
[Vol. 85
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Counsel had not yet been appointed when police officers obtained taped and
written statements from the accused at the county jail where he was incarcer-
ated. These statements were ultimately held to be inadmissible at trial and
were excluded from the State's case in chief. However, earlier in the trial refer-
ence was made to these statements by two police officers.
The defendant took the stand at trial and during direct examination, in an
attempt to further explain why these statements were not admitted, stated
that they had been made under duress. The trial judge agreed to allow the
prosecution to use the inadmissible second confession for the limited purpose
of impeachment on the issue of voluntariness. The defendant was convicted of
murder and sentenced to life without mercy.
The supreme court affirmed the conviction and the opinion by Justice Mc-
Hugh discussed the rationale of the United States Supreme Court in Harris
and Haas. Both of those cases involved Miranda rights violations by police
officers which rendered voluntary confessions inadmissible. The Supreme
Court in Harris indicated that trustworthiness was established by the lack of
evidence showing involuntariness or coercion"0 and held the confession to be
admissible impeachment evidence as to the general credibility of the
defendant.
3 1
The court noted the similarity between the facts in Haas and the facts in
Goodmon. Additionally, the court observed that the trial judge in Goodmon
had limited the use of the inadmissible confession to the issue of voluntariness
by an instruction given before the reading and playing of the confession. The
court adopted the Harris and Haas holding that inadmissible confessions vol-
untarily rendered are "admissible impeachment evidence on the issue of the
general credibility of the defendant as a witness.
' s 2
Justice McGraw, joined by Justice Harshbarger, dissented. The dissent
stated that the test for voluntariness of confessions under constitutional provi-
sions against self incrimination ought to be "whether or not the defendant
agrees at trial to the use of the words from his own mouth against him.' '33 The
dissent also stated that under this test, the West Virginia Constitution should
require inadmissible statements, even those voluntarily rendered, to be ex-
cluded from any use at trial.3
The Goodmon holding was held to be controlling in the unanimous deci-
sion of State v. Vance,3 5 filed the same day as the majority opinion in Good-
mon. 3 That case also involved a statement which was held to be inadmissible
30 401 U.S. at 224.
3, Id. at 225-26.
32 290 S.E.2d at 268.
-1 Id. at 270 (McGraw, J., dissenting).
34 Id. The dissent restricted application of this test to the West Virginia Constitution. This
avoids conflict with the holding in Haas that a state may not impose greater restrictions on police
activity under the federal constitution when the Supreme Court has specifically refused to impose
.them. Haas, 420 U.S. at 719.
31 285 S.E.2d 437 (W. Va. 1981).
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at trial level because the accused made a statement without counsel after hav-
ing requested court appointed counsel at his arraignment. The trial court held
an in camera hearing, determined that the statement was rendered voluntarily,
and allowed the statement to be used as impeachment evidence. The supreme
court affirmed the action.
However, the court refused to allow an involuntary statement to be used
as impeachment evidence in State v. Goff.37 The trial court in Goff had held
the defendant's inculpatory statement to police to be involuntary because of
the defendant's low IQ and his past relationship with the police as a part-time
informant. However the trial court allowed the prosecution to use the state-
ment for impeachment purposes. The defendant was subsequently convicted.
The supreme court identified two levels of involuntariness. The first level
of involuntariness identified is procedural in nature and encompasses the Mi-
randa rights.38 A confession found to be involuntary on this level is excluded
from the state's case in chief. The second level of involuntariness focuses on
the trustworthiness of a confession. This level appears to be the traditional
voluntariness inquiry which requires confessions to be obtained without coer-
cion. A confession found involuntary on this level cannot be used for any pur-
pose at trial. 9
The court held that since the defendant's statement had been found to be
involuntary on the second level, it was inadmissible at trial for any purpose.40
Accordingly, the court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a
new trial.
The adoption of the Harris and Haas holdings brings West Virginia in line
with the substantial majority of the states that have considered the issue.41
The varying use of the "involuntary" classification by the court in recent
decisions may be a source of confusion. In Persinger, the court held that a
Miranda rights violation rendered a statement "involuntary. '42 Goodmon au-
thorized the use, as impeachment evidence, of a statement found to be "inad-
missible" because of a Miranda rights violation if the statement was volunta-
rily rendered.43 It appears that the court used the term "involuntary" in
Persinger in the same context as "inadmissible" was used in Goodmon. The
two levels of voluntariness identified in Goff should be read as an attempt to
clarify the previous use of terms. Unfortunately, trial courts, prosecutors and
practitioners may not recognize that certain statements characterized as "in-
had dissented in Goodmon. Justice McGraw noted his previous dissent, but found the court bound
by the majority holding in Goodman in the disposition of Vance. 285 S.E.2d at 442.
37 289 S.E.2d 473 (W. Va. 1982).
" The first level of involuntariness is more commonly referred to under the more general
heading of admissibility. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Edwards v. Arizona, 451
U.S. at 487; see also Goodman, 290 S.E.2d at 266.
289 S.E.2d at 476; see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
40 289 S.E.2d at 477.
41 See Goodmon, 290 S.E.2d at 267 n.7.
4' 286 S.E.2d at 271; see supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
43 290 S.E.2d at 267-68; see supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 85
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voluntary" in Persinger are considered "inadmissible" in the Goodmon analy-
sis and can be used as impeachment evidence. Goff recognized the anomaly in
the two level distinction but did not correct it.
An additional area of uncertainty is whether statements which cannot be
used at trial because of non-Miranda procedural violations may be used as
impeachment evidence under Goodmon. The Mitter holding characterized the
prompt presentment violation as rendering the statement inadmissible and ap-
peared to use the term in the traditional sense. 44 It would, therefore, seem
likely that a statement violative of the prompt presentment provisions would
be admissible as impeachment evidence under Goodmon and Goff. Where
other procedural violations may fit into the analysis is, however, uncertain.
Steven P. McGowan
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